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SILENCE IS GOLDEN: MOMENTS OF SILENCE, 
LEGISLATIVE PRAYERS, AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Eric Segall* 
I’m wondering what you would think of the following: Suppose 
that as we began this session of the Court, the Chief Justice had called 
a minister up to the front of the courtroom, facing the lawyers, maybe 
the parties, maybe the spectators. And the minister had asked everyone 
to stand and to bow their heads in prayer and the minister said the 
following: He said, we acknowledge the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ 
on the cross. We draw strength from His resurrection. Blessed are you 
who has raised up the Lord Jesus. You who will raise us in our turn and 
put us by His side.  
The members of the Court who had stood responded amen, made 
the sign of the cross, and the Chief Justice then called your case. 
Would that be permissible? 
     —Justice Elena Kagan‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court is considering what 
may become a landmark decision on the constitutionality of prayers at town 
council meetings. At oral argument, Justice Kagan began by asking the 
question quoted above raising the hypothetical of whether an obviously 
Christian prayer (similar to the ones actually at issue in the case) would be 
allowed at the start of a Supreme Court session. The lawyer for the town 
fumbled the question (the answer is probably no), and for the next sixty 
minutes it seemed like the Justices would have preferred to be doing almost 
anything other than deciding this case. In fact, towards the end of the 
argument, Justice Kagan uttered the following sobering and depressing 
comments: “Part of what we are trying to do here is to maintain a multi-
religious society in a peaceful and harmonious way. And every time the 
Court gets involved in things like this, it seems to make the problem worse 
rather than better.”1 
 
*
  Eric Segall, Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of 
Law. 
‡
   Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. argued Nov. 
6, 2013) [hereinafter Galloway Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-696_5425.pdf. 
1
  Id. at 52. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 230 
In between Justice Kagan’s opening question and her final comments, 
the Justices wrestled with numerous difficult and divisive issues raised by 
this controversial Establishment Clause case, such as whether courts should 
be involved at all in defining the content of legislative prayers, setting forth 
guidelines for who will give the prayers, and making sure the prayers are 
inclusive enough to satisfy what will inevitably be vague and hard-to-
enforce constitutional standards. 
None of these questions have easy answers. Circuit courts all over the 
country have been struggling with these issues, and have reached divergent 
answers.2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that five Supreme Court Justices 
will agree to one set of guidelines to govern legislative prayers in different 
factual settings, and if they do not, we can expect more time-consuming, 
divisive, and expensive litigation. 
Yet, unlike most constitutional questions before the Supreme Court, 
the issue of legislative prayer actually has an easy answer, and one that has 
worked before. The Court should hold that the dignity of governmental 
hearings can be fully solemnized by a moment of silence where everyone in 
attendance can choose to silently pray or not pray, worship a god, several 
gods, or no god. With this solution, all of the difficult questions courts have 
grappled with would be answered once and for all and easily. There would 
be no more contentious litigation over the appropriate content of the 
prayers, no more community uprisings over the choice of prayer-givers, and 
mercifully no more hymns sung by legislators at official government 
sessions.3 
The only possible objection a person could make to this moment of 
silence solution is that it deprives people of speaker-led, overtly religious, 
organized prayers at governmental hearings. The possible incremental 
community solidarity benefits of having dedicated religious prayers over 
moments of silence, however, does not justify the acrimony, strife, and 
offense to nonbelievers caused by allowing the prayers. In a better world, 
the members of the Greece Town Council and legislators across the land 
would reach this conclusion on their own without judicial coercion. But, in 
the world we live in, where the Court seems to be involved in most of the 
controversial social and political issues of our day, the Court must decide 
this controversial issue. Judicial invalidation of legislative prayers and 
explicit judicial approval of moments of silence in lieu of such prayers is 
the most persuasive reading of the instruction that the government “shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”4 
 
2
  See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); Hinrichs v. Speaker of the 
House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007); Wynne v. Town of 
Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
3
  See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2006). 
4
  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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I. THE TOWN 
For many years, the Town of Greece, New York, began its council 
hearings with moments of silence. No one was offended and there were no 
lawsuits. Then in 1999, at the behest of a new town supervisor, the council 
decided to have a “chaplain of the month.”5 It is unclear exactly how these 
chaplains were selected, but for the next eight years 100% of the prayer-
givers were Christian and approximately two-thirds of the prayers referred 
specifically to Christian images or deities.6 Often, the prayer-giver would 
ask members of the audience to participate “by bowing their heads, 
standing, or joining in the prayer.”7 
Two town residents objected to the town council’s beginning its 
business with official Christian prayers. After the two residents filed a 
lawsuit, several non-Christians began offering the prayers but that practice 
quickly waned after the town won the lawsuit in the trial court.8 On appeal, 
however, a unanimous three-judge panel ruled for the residents.9 Given the 
totality of the circumstances, the court found that the town had affiliated 
itself with Christianity in a way that violated the Establishment Clause. 
Judge Calabresi, who wrote the opinion, painted the picture vividly: 
[M]ost prayer-givers appeared to speak on behalf of the town and its residents, 
rather than only on behalf of themselves. Prayer-givers often requested that the 
audience participate, and spoke in the first-person plural: let “us” pray, “our” 
savior, “we” ask, and so on. Town officials, whether intentionally or not, 
contributed to the impression that these prayer-givers spoke on the town’s 
behalf. After many of the prayer-givers finished their invocations, Auberger 
[the head of the town council] thanked them for being “our chaplain of the 
month.” . . . The invitation to audience members to participate in the prayer, 
particularly by physical means such as standing or bowing their heads, placed 
audience members who are nonreligious or adherents of non-Christian religion 
in the awkward position of either participating in prayers invoking beliefs they 
did not share or appearing to show disrespect for the invocation, thus further 
projecting the message that the town endorsed, and expected its residents to 
endorse, a particular creed.10 
II. COURTS’ PREVIOUS STRUGGLES WITH LEGISLATIVE PRAYERS 
A. The Supreme Court’s Historical Stance—Marsh v. Chambers 
 For sixteen years, Presbyterian minister Robert E. Palmer opened 
official sessions of the Nebraska state legislature with a prayer. In his 
 
5
  Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012). 
6
  Id. at 23–24. 
7
  Id. at 23. 
8
  Id. at 23. 
9
  Id. at 22. 
10
  Id. at 32–33. 
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absence, other clergy of other denominations sometimes delivered the 
prayer. A member of the Nebraska legislature objected and filed a lawsuit 
in federal court, but the Supreme Court upheld the practice of legislative 
prayers in Marsh v. Chambers.11 
To determine the constitutionality of the prayers, the Court looked 
almost exclusively to historical practice. The Court observed that the very 
first U.S. Congress began each session with prayer and both houses have 
been doing so ever since.12 Because the Establishment Clause was drafted at 
a time when both houses of Congress used legislative prayers, the Court 
held the practice today could not be unconstitutional. The practice of prayer 
in the Nebraska legislature, the Court said, was “simply a tolerable 
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country,”13 
and “it would be incongruous to interpret [the Establishment] Clause as 
imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the 
draftsmen imposed on the Federal Government.”14 
Determining that the Constitution did not forbid legislative prayers 
generally, the Court also examined the specific prayer practice in Nebraska. 
First, it considered Nebraska’s practice of having a permanent chaplain of 
one faith paid by taxpayer dollars. The Court held that the mere fact that a 
clergyman of only one denomination delivered the prayers did not suggest 
that religious beliefs were unlawfully advanced. After all, clergy of other 
religions often delivered the prayer in Palmer’s absence, and there was no 
proof that Palmer’s extended employment resulted from an “impermissible 
motive.”15 Based on this rationale, the Court found that Nebraska’s practice 
of opening up each legislative session with prayer by a publicly funded 
clergyman of only one denomination did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
Second, the Court considered the content of the prayers and found that 
they also did not violate the Establishment Clause. The majority found that 
there was no evidence that the prayers were used to further Christianity or 
disparage any other religion or belief.16 The Court was influenced by the 
chaplain’s promise, before the case was argued, to remove all references to 
Jesus from the prayers. In a subsequent Establishment Clause case, the 
Court strongly suggested that the prayers in Marsh were upheld mostly 
because they did not refer to any specific religious symbols or deities.17 The 
Court declined to credit the plaintiffs’ fears that the establishment of prayer 
 
11
  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
12
  Id. at 786–88. 
13
  Id. at 792. 
14
  Id. at 790–91. 
15
  Id. at 793. 
16
  Id. at 794–95. 
17
  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (citation omitted) (the chaplain in Marsh 
“had ‘removed all references to Christ,’” and this was why the prayers were upheld). 
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in these proceedings was just the beginning of the kind of establishment of 
religion that the Founders feared. 
B. Varying Applications of Marsh 
Since Marsh, lower courts have struggled with virtually every kind of 
legislative prayer issue imaginable and have applied different and 
conflicting tests. Some courts require the prayers to be nondenominational, 
some refuse to parse the prayers for content absent overt and obvious 
proselytizing conduct, and some courts have pleaded for more guidance 
from the Supreme Court.18 The battles over legislative prayers have been 
constant, bitter, and expensive.19 
Only a few examples are needed to show how problematic Marsh 
became in the years succeeding the case. In Cobb County, Georgia, a local 
government commission began its meetings with prayers offered by clergy 
who allegedly were invited on a rotating basis from diverse faiths. The 
plaintiffs alleged, and the Eleventh Circuit did not deny, that from 1998–
2005, almost 97% of the prayer-givers were Christian and almost 70% of 
the prayers contained explicitly Christian references.20 Despite this pattern, 
the Eleventh Circuit refused to even examine the nature of the prayers or 
the diversity of the prayer-givers saying that “[t]he federal judiciary has no 
business in ‘compos[ing] official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by 
government . . . .’”21 The court also held that the county did not 
unconstitutionally advance Christianity by “using predominantly Christian 
speakers,”22 because “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] any improper 
motive on the part of the commissioners . . . .”23 It is hard to imagine what 
evidence, other than an open confession by a commission member 
professing the desire to further Christianity and Christianity only, would 
have satisfied the Eleventh Circuit’s test that legislative prayers are 
unconstitutional only when they are used to affiliate the government with a 
specific religion or disparage particular religious beliefs.24 
In the Seventh Circuit, on April 5, 2005, the Indiana House Legislature 
began its proceedings with a religious prayer “Just a Little Talk with Jesus,” 
 
18
  See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 996 nn. 111–13 (2010) (collecting cases). 
19
  See Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the 
Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 713–15 (2009). 
20
  See Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008). 
21
  Id. at 1278 (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992)). 
22
  Id. at 1277. 
23
  Id. at 1278. 
24
  See Segall, supra note 19, at 718–19. 
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delivered by a Christian minister.25 The chaplain led a rousing sing-along of 
the prayer, causing some members to walk out of the session while others 
joined in the song.26 Looking at the entire 2005 session, Christian clergy 
delivered forty-one out of fifty-three prayers and at least twenty-nine 
prayers were identifiably Christian.27 The overtly Christian nature of the 
prayers led to long and expensive litigation, where the plaintiffs first 
prevailed, but then lost (on their second trip to the court of appeals) on 
standing grounds.28 
Perhaps there is no better indication of the chaos and confusion 
brought on by Marsh than the cases coming out of the Fourth Circuit. In 
two cases, the Fourth Circuit invalidated legislative prayers that were 
overtly Christian on the grounds that Marsh requires prayers to be 
nondenominational.29 In between these two decisions, a third case upheld 
the deliberate exclusion of a member of the Reclaiming Tradition of Wicca 
on the grounds that her religion did not fall within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition.30 
In the most recent Fourth Circuit case, Judge Wilkinson, a conservative 
judge who is a strong proponent of judicial deference,31 found that bringing 
sectarian prayers into a public forum, such as the local government, “is a 
prescription for religious discord”32: 
As our nation becomes more diverse, so also will our faiths. . . . But in their 
public pursuits, Americans respect the manifold beliefs of fellow citizens by 
abjuring sectarianism and embracing more inclusive themes. That the Board 
and religious leaders in Forsyth County hold steadfast to their faith is certainly 
no cause for condemnation. But where prayer in public fora is concerned, the 
deep beliefs of the speaker afford only more reason to respect the profound 
convictions of the listener. Free religious exercise posits broad religious 
tolerance.33 
Judge Wilkinson’s opinion in Joyner is a thoughtful, comprehensive, and 
persuasive explanation of why legislative prayers that contain sectarian 
language, such as many of the prayers given at the Greece Town Council, 
violate the core values of the Establishment Clause. 
 
25
  Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Hinrichs v. 
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007). 
26
  Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2006). 
27
  Id. 
28
  Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d at 585. 
29
  Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 
292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
30
  Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005). 
31
  See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012).  
32
  Joyner, 653 F.3d at 355. 
33
  Id. 
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C. Varying Tests for Establishment Clause Cases 
There is currently no consensus among the Justices or scholars over the 
appropriate test for Establishment Clause cases. Some of the Justices prefer 
the much-criticized Lemon test,34 some have adopted Justice O’Connor’s 
“no-endorsement” approach, and a few want to apply some form of 
“coercion” standard.35 The Marsh Court refused to apply any test and 
instead based its decision that the nondenominational prayers in that case 
were constitutional solely on the basis of the historical pedigree of 
legislative prayer. 
The mere fact that a governmental practice has existed for centuries, 
standing alone, should not justify constitutionally problematic behavior. 
Segregation, discrimination against women, and campaign finance laws 
limiting corporate spending on behalf of candidates are all examples of 
government activities with long historical pedigrees that were eventually 
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. As Michael McConnell has 
observed: 
 The interesting thing about the opinion [in Marsh] is that it is based 
squarely and exclusively on the historical fact that the framers of the first 
amendment did not believe legislative chaplains to violate the establishment 
clause. 
 . . . . 
 . . . If James Madison and the boys thought legislative chaplains were okay, 
who are we to disagree? 
 I dissent. I believe that Marsh v. Chambers represents original intent 
subverting the principle of the rule of law. Unless we can articulate some 
principle that explains why legislative chaplains might not violate the 
establishment clause, and demonstrate that that principle continues to be 
applicable today, we cannot uphold a practice that so clearly violates 
fundamental principles we recognize under the clause.36 
Professor McConnell is right that historical practice should not be 
allowed to subvert constitutional principle. Moreover, we need not struggle 
over which general Establishment Clause principle should control to 
develop a persuasive answer to the validity of legislative prayers. Whether 
 
34
  The Lemon test asks whether state (1) has a “secular legislative purpose,” (2) “inhibits” or 
“advances” religion, or (3) excessively entangles religion and government. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
35
  While there is some disagreement as to how a "coercion" test would be applied, the basic 
framework of the test would require a court to strike down a government action only where the 
government coerces citizens into religious activity by law or by threatened penalty. See Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36
  Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362 (1988) 
(emphasis in original). 
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we ask if such prayers unconstitutionally advance religion, endorse religion, 
or even coerce religion, the answers are all the same. 
III. SOLVING THE LEGISLATIVE PRAYER QUESTION WITH A NEW SOLUTION 
When you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your 
Father, who is unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in 
secret, will reward you.†† 
Those who have no choice but to attend a governmental meeting, or 
even those who have that choice, should not have their civic participation 
marred by religious prayers they do not believe. While the purpose of such 
prayers may be to instill some solemnity to legislative sessions, the actual 
effect is to link the government with some people’s, but inevitably not other 
people’s, religious values. Yet, the Establishment Clause is meant to 
prohibit governmental approval of some religions but not others.37 
The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution prohibits governmental 
conduct that penalizes, punishes, or directly coerces religious beliefs.38 That 
Clause prevents the government from singling out certain religions, or 
nonreligion, for unfavorable treatment under the law. The Establishment 
Clause must mean something different; otherwise it would be redundant. 
That something different is the idea that the government may not engage in 
behavior that puts its stamp of approval on certain religious beliefs or 
values. Even Justice Scalia seemed to recognize this point during the 
Galloway oral arguments. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: If there’s coercion . . . why do we need the Establishment 
Clause? If there’s coercion, I assume it would violate the Free Exercise Clause, 
wouldn’t it? 
MR. LAYCOCK: Well, I think that’s right. And that’s why— 
JUSTICE SCALIA: So it seems to me very unlikely that the test for the 
Establishment Clause is identical to the test for the Free Exercise Clause.39 
In other cases involving the separation of church and state, such as 
governmental aid to parochial schools or passive religious symbols on 
governmental property, it might be necessary to articulate what test, short of 
coercion, is appropriate for the Establishment Clause. And it may well be 
 
††
   Steve Sebelius, Praying for a Moment of Silence Instead, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Aug. 
21, 2012, 2:34 AM) (citing Matthew 6:6), http://www.reviewjournal.com/steve-sebelius/praying-
moment-silence-instead. 
37
  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
38
  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
39
  Galloway Oral Argument, supra note ‡Error! Bookmark not defined., at 35–36 (Justice Scalia 
questioned why we need the Establishment Clause and stated that the test for the Establishment Clause 
is not identical to the Free Exercise Clause). 
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that different tests would be better suited to different Establishment Clause 
problems. The Court need not define those parameters precisely, however, 
to resolve the issue of legislative prayers. All of the complexity and 
acrimony over this issue could simply evaporate with an obvious alternative 
that has worked well in the context of public elementary and secondary 
schools. 
If people want to pray at governmental meetings, or wish to begin the 
meeting with a solemn pause, a moment of silence would allow them to do 
so. People of a like mind could even join hands or bow their heads in 
unison (if done spontaneously). Other people could choose to reflect on 
anything or nothing at all. A uniform moment of silence would mark the 
event with seriousness and let everyone in attendance pause to consider the 
importance of the business about to be conducted.40 
At major sporting and theatrical events taking place after a national or 
even local tragedy, moments of silence are powerful tools of public 
awareness, shared understandings, and civic responsibility. There is no 
reason why, if moments of silence work in a 50,000-person football or 
baseball stadium, they would not adequately mark the importance of 
legislative or other governmental meetings. 
Some may argue, however, that a more appropriate judicial response to 
the problem of legislative prayers is to allow nondenominational prayers. 
This argument notes that it is undeniable that religion plays a major role in 
our society and the fabric of our culture, and thus generic references to God 
simply recognize the importance of religion to many Americans. Judge 
Wilkinson made this argument in the Joyner case when he stated that 
legislative prayers should strive to be nondenominational so that they “send 
a signal of welcome rather than exclusion. [They] should not reject the 
tenets of other faiths in favor of just one.”41 Judge Wilkinson believes that 
truly nondenominational prayers can mark the importance of governmental 
meetings without unduly endorsing or advancing certain religions over 
others, and religion over nonreligion. 
The problems with limiting legislative prayers to nondenominational 
references to a generic God, however, are many. First, the choice of prayer-
givers may still be controversial. A legislature that chooses only Christians 
to lead years of nondenominational prayers still sends a message to non-
Christians that their leaders do not merit an official governmental spotlight. 
Second, someone has to draft standards describing and defining what is or 
is not denominational. That places legislatures in the problematic role of 
dictating, and courts in the role of reviewing, the content of official prayers. 
Third and most importantly, even nondenominational prayers quite clearly 
 
40
  See Segall, supra note 19, at 737–39. 
41
  Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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favor religion over nonreligion and the belief in one God over the belief in 
many gods. 
If there were no way to recognize our religious heritage at 
governmental meetings without these prayers, maybe the issue would be 
different. But there is and the solution is obvious. A moment of silence 
where every person in attendance can pray to the God of their choice, or 
reflect on whatever beliefs they may hold, allows people to pray without 
government favoritism. Moments of silence have proven emotionally 
salient in thousands of public schools across our country (and at other 
public events). There is no reason that a moment of silence cannot 
adequately solemnize the important business conducted in the official halls 
of our legislatures, our courts, and our executive sessions. 
CONCLUSION 
Thirty years after Marsh v. Chambers was decided, we know that the 
battles over legislative prayers are frequent, politically divisive, and 
expensive. The fights over legislative prayers have put state and local 
governments in the business of picking and choosing which religious 
groups are entitled to have their prayers uttered at official meetings and 
which religions receive official government approval. These prayers tell 
people who are nonbelievers in any God, or who believe in many gods, that 
those views are not entitled to equal respect by their government. There is 
no way to avoid that conclusion in places like Greece, New York, where 
every prayer for eight years was given by a Christian “chaplain of the 
month,” or in Cobb County, Georgia, where the vast majority of prayers 
were given by Christians and contained Christian references, or in the halls 
of the Indiana legislature, where singing a hymn to Jesus seemed an 
acceptable thing to do. 
Like Judge Wilkinson, who struck down legislative prayers in the 
Fourth Circuit, I am a strong and passionate advocate of judicial deference 
to elected political officials,42 and like Justice Kagan, I think the Court’s 
exercise of judicial review often causes more harm than good.43 But there 
are rare times when judges must enforce our Constitution and reverse 
decisions of other political officials. Over fifty years ago, the Court stepped 
in and prohibited official prayers in public school classrooms and more 
recently at high school football games and graduation ceremonies. 
Although these decisions were controversial, there has not been a harmful 
backlash. Like many old and traditional practices that discriminate against 
traditionally disadvantaged groups (such as segregation and gender 
 
42
  See ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS 
JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012). 
43
  See Eric J. Segall, Beware a Gay Rights Backlash, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/15/opinion/la-oe-segall-gay-marriage-backlash-20120515. 
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discrimination), legislative prayers should not be upheld solely because 
they have been around for a long time. 
The only possible justification for judicial approval of an official 
moment of prayer over an official moment of silence is to mark the 
occasion with a religious component that many will find offensive and 
coercive. When the government’s sole motivation for a decision is a 
religious one, where there is no plausible secular benefit, where there is real 
harm, and where there is a satisfactory alternative to the enmeshing of 
church and state, the Establishment Clause blocks that choice. The 
members of the Greece Town Council, and those who attend legislative 
sessions there and all over this country, may pray to whomever they want, 
as often as they want, wherever they want. But our Constitution should 
prohibit them from making those prayers part of official governmental 
business. 
 
